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Abstract 
[Excerpt] On October 6,2010, the 27 member European Union (EU) and South Korea signed a bilateral free 
trade agreement (FTA). The agreement is expected to go into effect on July 1, 2011, pending approval by 
the European Parliament and the South Korean National Assembly. If enacted, the South Korea-EU FTA 
(KOREU FTA) would be the largest FTA in terms of market size that South Korea has entered into. The 
KOREU FTA reflects the EU and South Korean trade strategies to use FTAs to strengthen economic ties 
outside their home regions. It also builds upon the surge in trade and investment flows between South 
Korea and the EU over the past decade. This agreement has possible implications for U.S. trade with 
South Korea and congressional action on the proposed U.S.-South Korea FTA (KORUS FTA). 
The proposed KOREU FTA is very comprehensive. It would reduce and eliminate tariffs and other trade 
barriers in manufactured goods, agricultural products and services and would also cover such trade-
related activities as government procurement, intellectual property rights, labor rights and environmental 
issues. 
Most studies done on the potential impact of the KOREU FTA estimate that the agreement will have a 
small but positive effect on the economies of the EU and South Korea as a whole and that the larger 
relative impact would be on the South Korean economy. The greatest economic impact of the KOREU FTA 
would be on specific sectors in each economy. EU services providers would be expected to experience 
gains from the agreement, especially in the areas of retail and wholesale trade, transportation services, 
financial services, and business services. In terms of trade in goods, EU exporters of pharmaceuticals, 
auto parts, industrial machinery, electronics parts, and some agricultural goods and processed foods 
would be expected to gain from the KOREU FTA's implementation. At the same time, South Korean 
manufacturers of cars, ships, wireless telecommunications devices, chemical products, and imaging 
equipment would be expected to increase their exports to the EU market. 
The KOREU FTA is similar to the proposed KORUS FTA in many respects. Both agreements are 
comprehensive and both would eliminate tariffs on most trade in goods soon after they enter into force. 
However, they differ in other respects. Phase-out periods for tariffs on some manufactured goods differ. 
In addition, the KOREU FTA does not cover foreign direct investment. Unlike the KORUS FTA, the KOREU 
FTA would not allow trade sanctions to be applied where violations of the workers' rights, and 
environment provisions have been deemed to occur. In addition, the KORUS FTA would cover a broader 
range of trade in services than would the KOREU FTA. It is not clear whether these differences in the 
structures of the FTAs would result in appreciable differences in outcomes in terms of economic gains 
and losses. 
U.S. and European firms are close competitors in a number of sectors and industries, particularly autos. 
Some business representatives argue that enactment of the KOREU FTA before enactment of the KORUS 
FTA would give European competitors commercial first mover advantages, since EU firms, such as those 
in the auto industry or the services sector, could gain greater market opportunities in South Korea not 
afforded to US. firms. On the other hand, other factors could also mitigate such advantages. For example, 
U.S. multinational firms operating in the EU could benefit from the KOREU FTA. Nevertheless, the content 
and fate of the KOREU FTA could influence the pace and tone of any debate in the United States on the 
KORUS FTA in the 112th Congress. 
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Summary 
On October 6,2010, the 27 member European Union (EU) and South Korea signed a bilateral 
free trade agreement (FTA). The agreement is expected to go into effect on July 1, 2011, pending 
approval by the European Parliament and the South Korean National Assembly. If enacted, the 
South Korea-EU FTA (KOREU FTA) would be the largest FTA in terms of market size that South 
Korea has entered into. The KOREU FTA reflects the EU and South Korean trade strategies to 
use FTAs to strengthen economic ties outside their home regions. It also builds upon the surge in 
trade and investment flows between South Korea and the EU over the past decade. This 
agreement has possible implications for U.S. trade with South Korea and congressional action on 
the proposed U.S.-South Korea FTA (KORUS FTA). 
The proposed KOREU FTA is very comprehensive. It would reduce and eliminate tariffs and 
other trade barriers in manufactured goods, agricultural products and services and would also 
cover such trade-related activities as government procurement, intellectual property rights, labor 
rights and environmental issues. 
Most studies done on the potential impact of the KOREU FTA estimate that the agreement will 
have a small but positive effect on the economies of the EU and South Korea as a whole and that 
the larger relative impact would be on the South Korean economy. The greatest economic impact 
of the KOREU FTA would be on specific sectors in each economy. EU services providers would 
be expected to experience gains from the agreement, especially in the areas of retail and 
wholesale trade, transportation services, financial services, and business services. In terms of 
trade in goods, EU exporters of pharmaceuticals, auto parts, industrial machinery, electronics 
parts, and some agricultural goods and processed foods would be expected to gain from the 
KOREU FTA's implementation. At the same time, South Korean manufacturers of cars, ships, 
wireless telecommunications devices, chemical products, and imaging equipment would be 
expected to increase their exports to the EU market. 
The KOREU FTA is similar to the proposed KORUS FTA in many respects. Both agreements are 
comprehensive and both would eliminate tariffs on most trade in goods soon after they enter into 
force. However, they differ in other respects. Phase-out periods for tariffs on some manufactured 
goods differ. In addition, the KOREU FTA does not cover foreign direct investment. Unlike the 
KORUS FTA, the KOREU FTA would not allow trade sanctions to be applied where violations of 
the workers' rights, and environment provisions have been deemed to occur. In addition, the 
KORUS FTA would cover a broader range of trade in services than would the KOREU FTA. It is 
not clear whether these differences in the structures of the FTAs would result in appreciable 
differences in outcomes in terms of economic gains and losses. 
U.S. and European firms are close competitors in a number of sectors and industries, particularly 
autos. Some business representatives argue that enactment of the KOREU FTA before enactment 
of the KORUS FTA would give European competitors commercial first mover advantages, since 
EU firms, such as those in the auto industry or the services sector, could gain greater market 
opportunities in South Korea not afforded to US. firms. On the other hand, other factors could 
also mitigate such advantages. For example, U.S. multinational firms operating in the EU could 
benefit from the KOREU FTA. Nevertheless, the content and fate of the KOREU FTA could 
influence the pace and tone of any debate in the United States on the KORUS FTA in the 112th 
Congress. 
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Introduction 
After more than two years of negotiations, the European Union (EU) and South Korea signed a 
bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) on October 6, 2010. The agreement is expected to go into 
effect provisionally on July 1, 2011, pending approval by the European Parliament and the South 
Korean National Assembly. If enacted, the South Korea-EU FTA (KOREU FTA) would be the 
largest FTA in terms of market size that South Korea has entered into. The proposed U.S.-South 
Korea FTA (KORUS FTA) would be South Korea's second largest if approved. The KOREU FTA 
reflects the EU and South Korean trade strategies to use FTAs to strengthen economic ties outside 
their home regions. It also builds upon the surge in trade and investment flows between South 
Korea and the EU over the past decade, a period of time in which the 27 member states of the EU 
countries collectively passed the United States in economic importance to South Korea.1 
The proposed KOREU FTA is very comprehensive, generally mirroring the scope of the KORUS 
FTA, with some exceptions. As with the KORUS FTA, the KOREU FTA would reduce and 
eliminate tariffs and other trade barriers in manufactured goods, agricultural products, and 
services and would also cover such trade-related activities as government procurement, 
intellectual property rights, labor rights, and environmental issues. However, the two agreements 
contain some basic differences in coverage, reflecting differing circumstances and priorities. For 
example, unlike the KORUS FTA, the KOREU FTA does not include a specific chapter on 
foreign direct investment and would not allow trade sanctions to be applied where violations of 
the labor and environment provisions have taken place. Differences also exist in how sensitive 
sectors such as automobiles are treated. For example, the KOREU FTA includes a duty drawback 
mechanism2, while the KORUS FTA has added a special safeguard for motor vehicles in the 
event of a surge in South Korean automobile exports to the United States. 
The KORUS FTA was signed on June 30, 2007, but has not been submitted by the Obama 
Administration to Congress for consideration, due in part to opposition of some Members of 
Congress to taking it up until their concerns over South Korea's restrictive treatment of imports of 
U.S.-made cars and U.S. beef and some other issues are resolved On December 3, 2010, 
President Obama announced that cabinet-level negotiations and his discussions with South 
Korean President Lee Myung-bak produced modifications in the KORUS FTA that he believes 
addresses his concerns and those of Congress. The President is expected to send implementing 
legislation early in the 112th Congress. 
The KOREU FTA has drawn the attention and interest of U.S. policymakers, including Members 
of Congress and the U.S. business community. If enacted, the KOREU FTA could have an impact 
on U.S.-South Korean trade by possibly diverting some South Korean trade away from the United 
States to the EU and could provide the EU with a "first mover" advantage. The agreement, 
particularly if it goes into effect on July 1, 2011, could also influence the pace and timing of the 
congressional debate on the proposed KORUS FTA in the 112th Congress. 
1
 The 27 member states of the EU are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
2
 Duty drawback permits the refund of duties paid on parts used for the production of a final product to be refunded 
when the final product is exported. 
Congressional Research Service 1 
The EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement and Its Implications for the United States 
This report is designed to shed some light on the KOREU FTA for Congress.3 It briefly reviews 
EU-South Korean economic ties and the respective EU and South Korean objectives regarding 
the KOREU FTA. It then discusses the KOREU FTA in general and examines some of its major 
provisions in more detail, with special focus on autos and some other manufacturing sectors, 
agriculture, services, and labor—areas of particular interest to U.S. policymakers and the U.S. 
business community. The report does not attempt to determine if one FTA is better than the other. 
That determination can largely be subjective, since the priorities of the EU and the United States 
differed in some respects. In addition, the models used in measuring the quantifiable effects of the 
two agreements likely differ leading to incompatible measurements. Nevertheless, where possible 
and relevant, the report draws general comparisons and contrasts with the proposed KORUS FTA. 
Finally, the report analyzes the prospects for the KOREU FTA and the agreement's potential 
implications for the United States. 
EU-South Korean Economic Ties 
Trade in goods and services and two-way foreign direct investment (FDI) are generally the most 
important aspects of the EU-South Korea relationship.4 
Merchandise Trade 
South Korea, with 48.6 million consumers and a gross domestic product (GDP) of $1.4 trillion, is 
a much smaller market than either the U.S. or EU markets. In 2009, it accounted for 2% of EU 
merchandise exports, ranking 12th as an export market, and accounted 3% of EU merchandise 
imports, ranking 9th as a source of EU imports. On the other hand, the much larger EU market of 
492 million people with a GDP of $14.4 trillion is much more important to South Korea. In 2009, 
the EU was the second largest market for South Korean merchandise exports, with a 13% share of 
total South Korean exports, second to China with a 24% share. The EU was the third largest 
source of South Korean imports in 2009 with a 10% share of South Korean merchandise imports 
behind China with a 17% share and Japan with a 15% share. Over the last 10 years (2000-2009), 
EU-South Korean trade (exports plus imports) has increased an average of 8.4% per year and 
exceeds total U.S.-South Korea trade (see Figure 1). Among the EU-27 member countries, South 
Korea's largest trading partners are Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. 
3
 The report supplements other CRS reports on the KORUS FTA .including CRS Report RL34330, The Proposed U.S.-
South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA): Provisions and Implications, coordinated by William R Cooper, 
CRS Report R41389, Pending U.S. and EUFree Trade Agreements with South Korea: Possible Implications for 
Automobile and Other Manufacturing Industries , by Michaela D. Platzer, and CRS Report RL34528, US-South 
Korea Beef Dispute: Issues and Status, by Remy Jurenas and Mark £. Manyin. 
4
 In contrast to the 19th and early 20th centuries, when European colonial powers were formative influences in Northeast 
Asia, the EU and its members currently play somewhat secondary or tertiary roles in security issues on the Korean 
Peninsula and in East Asia. For instance, the EU is not a participant in the Six-Party Talks over North Korea's nuclear 
programs. However, it has supported the process diplomatically and financially. During the Korean War, ten European 
countries contributed to the United Nations' military forces that were deployed to assist South Korea. 
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Figure I. EU and U.S.Total Merchandise Trade with South Korea, 2000-2009 
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Source: Global Trade Atlas. 
Note: Total trade is defined as exports plus imports. 
Manufactured goods dominate EU-South Korean trade. In 2009, 80% of EU exports to South 
Korea consisted of manufactured goods. Within that category, 49% were of machinery and 
transportation equipment, 18% of chemical products, and 13% of other manufactured goods.5 
Similarly, in 2009, 87% of South Korean exports to the EU consisted of manufactured goods. Of 
that group, 72% were of machinery and transportation equipment, 10% were other manufactured 
goods, and 5% were of chemical products. The dominance of manufacturing in trade in both 
directions suggests the presence of intra-industry trade and reflects the existence of transnational 
production networks where various stages within a production cycle are performed in different 
countries before the final product is assembled, marketed, and sold.6 
Trade in Commercial Services and FDI Flows 
EU-South Korean services trade has also increased over the years but still accounts for a small 
share (15.8% in 2008) of total bilateral trade.7 EU exports of services to South Korea increased 
42% between 2004 and 2008 (latest data available), and South Korean exports of services to the 
5
 The data were obtained from Eurostat. 
6 Intra-industry trade is the export and import of the same products or similar products within one industry. The 
products are distinguished by model, style, price, or other factors or by their place in the production process, for 
example, auto parts versus a fully assembled car. For more information on intra-industry trade and global supply chains 
see CRS Report R40167, Globalized Supply Chains and U.S. Policy, by Dick K. Nanto. 
7
 CRS calculations based on data found in European Commission, DG Trade, Bilateral Trade with South Korea, 
September 15,2010. 
Congressional Research Service 3 
The EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement and Its Implications for the United States 
EU increased 36% during the same period.8 Among the leading types of EU services exports to 
South Korea in 2008 were transportation services, business services, travel, receipts and royalties 
from the use of intellectual property, financial services, and construction. Leading South Korean 
services exports in 2008 to the EU included transportation, business services, travel, receipts and 
royalties, and insurance.9 
Besides trade in goods and services, the EU and South Korea are building economic ties through 
foreign direct investment (FDI). From 2004 to 2007, the value of EU FDI in South Korea 
increased 62.8% before decreasing 10.8% in 2008, possibly a result of the global economic 
downturn. However, EU FDI in South Korea accounted for only 0.3% of total EU FDI in 2008 
based on current value. South Korean FDI in the EU increased 80.4% from 2004 to 2007 before 
declining 20.6% in 2008. They accounted for about 0.1% of total FDI in the EU.10 On the other 
hand, the EU is a significant source of FDI in South Korea. In 2008, it accounted for 32.3% of 
total FDI in South Korea, and as a group was the largest source of FDI in South Korea. The EU-
27 also accounted for 10.3% of South Korean FDI abroad in 2008 and was the second largest 
target next to the United States.11 
Table I. Relative Importance of EU and U.S. to South Korea 
EU U.S. 
Share of South Korean . _ „ . . . . 
Merchandise Exports (2009) 
Share of South Korean
 |ft_, _^, 
Merchandise Imports (2009) 
Share of South Korean Inward FDI - ^
 lfV^ 
(2008) 
Share of South Korean Outward
 | n „ . _ „ 
FDI (2008) I U * , y * 
Source: Derived from official South Korean data. 
The KOREU FTA and EU and South Korean 
Trade Strategies 
The KOREU FTA reflects the larger trade strategies that the EU and South Korea have pursued 
Prior to the mid-2000s, both were reluctant to enter into bilateral FTAs, preferring to conduct 
trade through the World Trade Organization (WTO) and, in the case of the EU, through regional 
preferential trade arrangements with former colonies. However, over the last decade, they both 
have not only been negotiating FTAs, but have done so at an accelerated pace. 
" The data were obtained from Eurostat and values were converted into dollars using prevailing exchange rates during 
the relevant years. 
9
 WTO, International Trade Statistics, 2010, p. 123-158. 
10
 CRS calculations based on Eurostat data. 
1
' CRS calculations based on official South Korean data as reported to the OECD. 
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The EU was a pioneer in negotiating preferential trade arrangements (PTAs)—a general term 
applied to an arrangement in which member countries agree to eliminate barriers to commerce 
among them. The EU itself is a single market, one of the most comprehensive PTAs, but has also 
used PTAs to anchor trade relations with neighboring countries, such as members of the European 
Free Trade Area (EFTA—Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland) and as a transition 
mechanism in trade relations with countries slated to accede to the EU. The EU has also 
employed PTAs to preserve preferential trade relationships with former colonies among 
developing countries. However, the EU imposed a moratorium on the formation of FTAs and 
other PTAs from 1999-2006 to focus attention on the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) 
negotiations.12 
The FTA with South Korea is part of a new wave of EU FTAs and part of an overall strategy— 
referred to as Global Europe—which the European Commission's Directorate General for Trade 
announced in 2006. The strategy was developed to respond to the challenges faced by EU 
members in a rapidly globalizing economy. An objective of that strategy is to work towards 
reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers in trade and to liberalize markets for foreign investment. 
The EU also places a priority on multilateral negotiations in the WTO and concluding the DDA to 
accomplish this objective. 
However, the EU also has determined that some barriers are currently too complex for 
multilateral negotiations or are otherwise beyond the purview of the WTO, for example, 
competition policy, regulatory issues, government procurement, and stronger intellectual property 
rights enforcement. As part of the Global Europe strategy, the EU has engaged in FTA 
negotiations with the objective that the FTAs are more appropriate vehicles to address these more 
complex issues and can serve as building blocks toward a more robust multilateral trading 
system. The Global Europe strategy sets down two main criteria for selecting FTA partners: (1) 
that the partner country offers sufficient market potential and (2) a sufficient level of growth 
opportunities that would result from the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers as a result of the 
FTA. Based on these criteria, along with the fact that South Korea had negotiated an agreement 
with the United States (a chief EU competitor) the European Commission identified South Korea 
as a priority country for an FTA.13 The EU has FTAs in force with Chile and Mexico and has been 
negotiating FTAs with Canada, India, and South Africa. (See Table A-3.)14 The KOREU FTA 
would be the EU's first completed FTA in Asia. 
South Korea's Strategy 
For nearly a decade, South Korea has been transforming itself into an FTA hub in Northeast Asia. 
(See Table A-4.)15 Signing a network of FTAs has been a key part of the national economic 
12
 For an analysis of the European Union's FTAs in the context of its trade strategy, see CRS Report R41143, Europe's 
Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications, by Raymond J. Ahearn. 
13
 European Commission Directorate-General for Trade, Global Europe: Competing in the World. 2006, pp. 10-11. 
14
 CRS Report R41143, Europe's Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications. 
15
 In addition to completing FTA negotiations with the EU and United States, South Korea has entered into FTAs with 
Chile, Singapore, European Free Trade Area (EFTA), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and India 
and has just concluded an agreement with Peru. ASEAN is comprised of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Myanmar (Burma), Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. South Korea continues to negotiate FTAs with 
Canada, Mexico, Australia, New Zealand, Peru, Colombia, and Turkey and is considering FTA negotiations with 
China, Japan, (as well as a South Korea-China-Japan trilateral arrangement), MERCOSUR, Russia, Israel, and the 
South African Customs Union (SACU). 
Congressional Research Service 5 
The EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement and Its Implications for the United States 
strategy of President Lee Myung-bak, a conservative, and his predecessor, the left-of-center Roh 
Moo-hyun. Both presented FTAs as necessary for advancing South Korea's economic well-being. 
Ongoing competitive pressure from Japanese firms, increased competition from Chinese 
enterprises, and the rapid ageing of the South Korean workforce have heightened the sense of 
urgency about boosting national competitiveness. President Lee has set a goal of building a "free-
trade network" that by 2014 would enable over 70% of South Korean exports to enjoy duty free 
access. He has explicitly tried to diversify the composition of South Korea's FTA partners, 
simultaneously negotiating FTAs with large advanced economies as well as with natural resource-
rich developing countries.,6 The KOREU FTA also fits into Lee's goal of creating a "Global 
Korea" by expanding South Korea's engagement with and presence in the international 
community. 
An Overview and Key Provisions of the 
KOREU FTA 
Similar to the KORUS FTA, the KOREU FTA is a comprehensive pact that covers the broad 
range of economic activities in the EU-South Korean bilateral economic relationship. The 
KOREU FTA is organized into 15 chapters plus special sector specific annexes, which cover 
automotive products, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and consumer electronics. If enacted, the 
KOREU FTA would eliminate tariffs on virtually all manufactured goods in South Korea-EU 
bilateral trade within seven years and would reduce or eliminate many nontariff barriers (NTBs). 
The agreement would also establish rules and procedures in trade in goods and services and 
would address trade-related activities pertaining to intellectual property rights (IPR), labor rights, 
and environmental protection. 
Similar to the objectives of the KORUS FTA, the provisions in the pending KOREU FTA are 
intended to boost goods and services exports from the EU to South Korea by scrapping South 
Korean import duties and other barriers in industries from autos and pharmaceuticals to consumer 
electronics and textiles and apparel. Exports from South Korea to the EU might increase in 
various manufacturing sectors but are not expected to surge since many EU tariffs are already 
relatively low and the EU's NTBs are for the most part not as significant as in South Korea. The 
KOREU FTA also is intended to increase FDT flows between the two partners, especially EU 
investment in South Korea. 
The following discussion provides an overview of the KOREU FTA as a whole but also focuses 
on possible areas of particular importance with implications for the ongoing debate in the United 
States over the future of the proposed KORUS FTA. These areas include trade in certain 
manufactured goods sectors (the automobile sector in particular), agricultural products, and 
services, and issues pertaining to IPR, worker rights and environmental protection. Where 
feasible and appropriate, the following discussion includes references to and comparisons of the 
KOREU FTA with relevant provisions of the KORUS FTA. 
16
 Office of the [South Korean] President, Global Korea. The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Korea, June 
2009, p.29; South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "Building [sic] Global FTA Network," in 2009 
Diplomatic White Paper. 
Congressional Research Service 6 
The EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement and Its Implications for the United States 
Trade in Manufactured Goods 
A major portion of South Korea-EU trade in both directions is in manufactured goods. Thus, an 
important element of the KOREU FTA consists of the removal of tariffs and NTBs on 
manufactured goods. In negotiating their respective FTAs with South Korea, the United States 
and the EU worked to ensure that provisions in their agreements responded to concerns expressed 
by those vocal constituencies about free trade and imports (e.g., the U.S. and EU automotive 
sectors). 
Auto Trade 
• Bilateral trade in cars has been a major point of contention in EU-South Korea 
trade relations and consequently a major sticking point in negotiations on the 
KOREU FTA, as has been the case in the KORUS FTA. The sensitivity of the 
issue has only grown as South Korea has become a major producer and exporter 
of cars in competition with European manufacturers of cars, especially smaller 
cars, and has attained expanding shares of the European market for passenger 
cars.17 
• During the negotiations, South Korea sought to obtain the elimination of EU 
tariffs on imports of South Korean cars in order to increase their market share. 
The EU sought not only the elimination of South Korean tariffs on cars but also 
changes in regulations, including safety and emissions regulations, that EU 
manufacturers have complained are discriminatory and impede their access to the 
South Korean market, an issue that U.S. manufacturers constantly cite, that is 
addressed in the KORUS FTA. 
Tariff Elimination on Passenger Cars and Trucks 
As shown in Table 2, under the KOREU FTA, if enacted, the EU and South Korea would 
eliminate all of their tariffs on passenger cars and trucks over five years, including tariffs on 
electric vehicles. Their respective tariffs on auto parts—8% for South Korea and 3% to 4.5% for 
the EU—would be immediately removed. 
The 2007 KORUS FTA would have eliminated their respective passenger car tariffs more quickly 
than under the KOREU FTA upon implementation. But the 2010 supplemental agreement 
changed the original terms of the KORUS FTA.18 It now puts the U.S. and EU on roughly the 
same tariff elimination schedule, rather than abolishing them immediately. For instance, South 
Korea would eliminate its 8% tariff on U.S. passenger cars (including electric cars and plug-in 
hybrids) within five years following implementation. One exception is the U.S. truck tariff of 
25% which would remain for the first eight years following implementation and would then be 
phased out completely in year ten. 
17
 For more details about the South Korean automotive market see CRS Report R41389, Pending U.S. and EU Free 
Trade Agreements with South Korea: Possible Implications for Automobile and Other Manufacturing Industries , by 
Michaela D. Platzer. 
18
 White House, Increasing U.S. Auto Exports and Growing U.S. Auto Jobs Through the U.S.-Korea Trade Agreement, 
December 3, 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/defeult/files/ 
fact_sheet_increasing_us_auto_exports_us_korea_free_trade_agreement.pdf. 
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Another difference is the 2010 KORUS FTA agreement added a special motor vehicle safeguard 
whereas the KOREU FTA offers protection in case of a sudden surge in imports via a general 
safeguard clause. The two agreements also diverge on rules of origin, which are used to verify 
that products are eligible for duty-free status under preferential trading programs. The KORUS 
FTA requires that 35% of the content in an automobile originates in either the United States or 
South Korea, while the KOREU FTA requires that 55% of the content be from either the EU or 
South Korea. 
Table 2. Comparison of Automobile Tariff Reductions 
Proposed Tariff Reduction Commitments and Time Frame for Tariff Elimination 
under the Pending KORUS FTA and KOREU FTA 
South Korea European Union United States 
Passenger Cars 
Electric 
Vehicles/Plug-in 
Hybrid 
Vehiclesb 
Trucks1 
Current 
Base 
Tariff 
Rate Time Frame 
8% KORUS FTA: 
Reduce tariff 
from 8% to 4% 
immediately and 
fully eliminate 
the tariff in year 
5. 
KOREU FTA: 
Eliminated over 
3 or 5 years 
depending on 
engine size. 
8% KORUS FTA: 
Reduce tariff to 
4% immediately 
and fully 
eliminate by 
year 5. 
KOREU FTA: 
Eliminated over 
5 years. 
10% KORUS FTA: 
Eliminated 
immediately. 
KOREU FTA: 
Eliminated 
immediately or 
3 to 5 years 
depending on 
truck size. 
Current 
Base 
Tariff Time 
Rate Frame 
10% KOREU 
FTA: 
Eliminated 
over 3 or 5 
years 
depending 
on engine 
size.* 
10% KOREU 
FTA: 
Eliminated 
over 5 years. 
22% KOREU 
FTA: 
Eliminated 
over 3 or 5 
years 
depending 
on truck 
size. 
Current 
Base Tariff 
Rate 
2.5% 
2.5% 
25% 
Time Frame 
KORUS FTA: 
Eliminated in 
year 5 (no 
linear phase-
out). 
KORUS FTA: 
Eliminated over 
5 years. 
KORUS FTA: 
Remains in 
place until year 
8 and phased 
out by year 10. 
Source: CRS, compiled from South Korean, EU, and U.S. Tariff Schedules. 
a. The European Union 10% tariff would be phased out over three years for some passenger vehicles that fall 
into certain HTS codes like passenger vehicles with engines over 3,000 cc (HTS 8703.24) or five years for 
smaller cars: cars with engines over 1,000 cc, but not over 1,500 cc (HTS 8703.22). South Korea would also 
eliminate its tariffs over three to five years, depending on engine size. 
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b. Not aH hybrid vehicles are covered by this category. Vehicles in this tariff classification are those in which 
the gas- or diesel-powered engine "does not give the vehicle's power system its essential character," which 
in the case of South Korea include electric vehicles (HSK 8703.90.70) and Other Vehicles (HSK 8703.90.90). 
c. Tariffs on trucks apply to "motor vehicles for the transport of goods," which basicaly cover pickup trucks, 
panel vans, and commercial vehicles. Trucks are categorized by gross vehicles weight (GVW) and by engine 
type (gas or diesel) but not by engine size. Many light trucks (i.e., SUVs and minivans) are counted as 
passenger cars. 
Duty Drawback 
One of the more controversial provisions of the KOREU FTA is a duty drawback mechanism. 
Duty drawback allows an exporter to receive a rebate of any customs duties paid on imports that 
were integrated into the exported product. The KOREU FTA marks the first time the EU included 
such a provision in a bilateral or multilateral trading agreement.19 
Duty drawback may be particularly important for automotive exports. Under this procedure, a 
South Korean car manufacturer could buy auto parts from manufacturers in low-cost countries 
such as China, import them into South Korea, and claim the duties back when the assembled 
vehicles are shipped to the European Union. As an example, Chinese radios could enter the EU 
duty-free as part of South Korean cars, whereas EU companies pay a 14% tariff when importing 
the same radios directly from China. 
This duty drawback provision raises the question of whether the KOREU FTA will allow South 
Korean producers to relocate parts of their production chain to lower cost countries. European 
auto manufacturers have warned that the text could open the EU car market to autos with a 
significant percentage of Chinese components. The KOREU FTA includes a provision to 
permanently cap refundable tariffs at 5% should there be a "notable increase" in foreign sourcing 
by South Korean manufacturers starting five years after the agreement goes into effect, but the 
European Automobile Manufacturers' Association has nonetheless strongly opposed the inclusion 
of the duty drawback provision in the KOREU FTA. No explicit reference to duty drawback is 
included in the KORUS FTA and therefore the practice with no accompanying safeguards would 
be allowed. 
Safety and Environmental Automotive Standards 
South Korea is a relatively small market for autos, with domestic sales of 1.2 million passenger 
cars in 2010.20 Foreign manufacturers wishing to sell in this market must meet South Korea's 
safety and environmental standards. This means foreign, including European and U.S., 
automakers must customize their vehicles for the South Korean market, which, these automakers 
claim, raises their costs and discourages imports. (Fewer than 61,000 foreign automobiles were 
sold in South Korea in 2009). U.S. car manufacturers, particularly Ford, consider South Korea's 
unique automobile standards a significant barrier to imports of U.S.-made cars to South Korea. 
19
 The mechanics of the KOREU FTA duty drawback provision are covered in Protocol 1: Rules of Origin, Title IV, 
Article 14: Drawback of, or Exemption From, Customs Duties in the KOREU FTA, which can be found on the 
European Commission's website, EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement online, http://fra6t.ec.eOTcpa.eu/doclib/press/ 
index.cfin?id=443&serie=273&langld=en. 
20
 Korea Automobile Manufacturers Association, Reports & Statistics, http://www.kama.or.kr/eng/R&s/Rsoften_e? 
key=Production. 
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Standards-related issues have been an important factor in holding up further consideration of the 
agreement in Congress. 
EU negotiators also made automotive standards a priority in the negotiations on the KOREU 
FTA. NTB reforms on automotive trade include a regulatory convergence approach based on the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) standards,21 which commits South 
Korea to recognize as equivalents international automotive standards set upon implementation.22 
Another 29 safety standards related to such things as seat belts, passenger seats, headlamps, and 
rearview mirrors will be brought into line with UNECE standards over a five-year transitional 
period. All other standards not subject to harmonization or equivalence should be applied in a 
manner which does not limit market access. Any new standards would be based on UNECE 
standards, and going forward the KOREU FTA states new features and technologies should not 
hinder trade.23 
The KORUS FTA takes a different approach and includes a "low volume seller exemption" which 
would allow each U.S. automaker to sell up to 25,000 vehicles per year in South Korea built to 
U.S. safety standards without any additional modification.24 This is four times the level permitted 
in the 2007 KORUS FTA which would have limited each U.S. automaker to 6,500 vehicles per 
year. Raising the level means U.S. carmakers will be able to build more cars to U.S. safety 
standards and export these automobiles to the smaller South Korea market without incurring any 
additional costs that alterations and adjustments to South Korean standards would require. 
The KOREU FTA, like the KORUS FTA, includes provisions on auto emissions standards and 
both would establish a working group on motor vehicles and parts to serve as an early warning 
system for potential trade barriers related to testing and certification standards and the 
implementation of future standards on requirements related to autos, particularly automotive 
environmental standards. 
Other Manufactured Goods 
Of particular interest to EU manufacturers (and to U.S. manufacturers) is the KOREU FTA's 
coverage of the following industries. 
• Pharmaceuticals and medical devices: Many of South Korea's tariffs on 
imports of pharmaceutical products of 8% are to be phased out immediately upon 
implementation of the KOREU FTA; others will be eliminated within three years. 
Tariffs on medical device exports would also be removed—immediately for 
21
 The World Forum for the Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations is a working party (WP.29) of the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe. Its aims to develop harmonized motor vehicle regulations worldwide covering 
vehicle safety, environmental standards, energy efficiency and anti-theft performance. Neither the United States nor 
Canada recognizes UNECE motor vehicle standards. 
22
 The automotive standards are listed in Appendix 2-C-3 and cover such things as steering control, seating systems, 
head restraints, sun visor impact, and lighting and signaling systems, see http://trade.ec.europa.eii/doclib/docs/2009/ 
october/tradocl 45157.pdf. 
23
 European Commission, DG Trade, EU-Korea FTA: A Quick Reading Guide, October 20,2009, p. 3. 
httpy/trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/october/tradoc_145203.pdf. 
24
 White House, Increasing U.S. Auto Exports and Growing U.S. Auto Jobs Through the U.S.-Korea Trade Agreement, 
December 5, 2010, http://www.wWtehouse.gov/sites/defeuh7fjles/ 
fact_sheetjno«asing_us_auto_expoi1s_us_korea_fTee_trad^_agreement_v2_0.pdf. 
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many products, phased in over three years for others, and over a longer period of 
time for a few selected products. The KOREU FTA also specifically provides that 
the South Korean authorities will introduce new rules to align their practices with 
international standards and a more secure regulatory environment will be 
introduced through a better recognition of the value of innovative products. In 
addition, the KOREU FTA also introduces detailed binding rules on transparency 
regarding decisions on reimbursement, and stipulates the possibility that pricing 
decisions could be reviewed by a court. The KOREU FTA provisions on 
pharmaceuticals also require that decisions on reimbursement and pricing be 
objective and clear. To further regulatory cooperation in the pharmaceutical and 
medical device sector, the KOREU FTA would establish a Working Group on 
Pharmaceutical Products and Medical Devices as would the KORUS FTA. 
Consumer electronics: Included in the KOREU FTA is a special annex on non-
tariff barriers related to consumer electronics with an objective of addressing 
technical barriers, especially a lack of recognition of international standards. The 
KOREU FTA would permit EU exporters to conduct safety testing in the EU, 
effectively reducing their costs and cutting back on bureaucratic hurdles. In 
contrast, the KORUS FTA does not include separate provisions on standards, 
testing, and certification for consumer electronics exports from the United States 
to South Korea. 
Textiles and apparel: Implementation of the KOREU FTA would result in the 
abolition of most tariffs on textiles and apparel, 92% of which will be eliminated 
immediately, with the others to be eliminated over five years. This is similar to 
the KORUS FTA. The KOREU FTA will maintain the European Union's 
standard rules of origin with only a small number of exceptions. The KORUS 
FTA adopts a "yarn forward" rule, which means generally apparel using yarn and 
fabric from the United States and South Korea would qualify for preferential 
treatment. A special textile safeguard is included in the KORUS FTA, which 
would allow the United States to impose tariffs on certain goods should injury 
occur due to import surges. 
Cross-Cutting Manufactured Goods Provisions 
The KOREU and KORUS FTA contains provisions that apply primarily to trade in other 
manufactured goods. EU manufacturers currently pay tariffs on the overwhelming majority of all 
industrial products they export to South Korea, which applied an average most-favored-nation 
(MFN) tariff rate of 6.6% on non-agricultural goods in 2008.25 Tariffs are higher for appliances, 
pharmaceuticals, and textiles. Under the terms of the KOREU FTA, the EU agreed to eliminate 
all of its import tariffs on industrial goods within five years and South Korea would remove all of 
its tariffs within seven years. This would be faster than under the KORUS FTA, where the United 
States would eliminate all of its industrial tariffs over 10 years.26 
• 
25
 World Trade Organization, World Tariff Profiles 2009, Republic of Korea, p. 102. http://www.intracen.org/ 
nwketanalysis/Docs/Tariff_Profiles/Tariff_Profiles_09_ENG_LR.pdf. 
26
 Lee Jong-Kyu, Korea-EU FTA: Major Features and Implications, Samsung Economic Research Institute, August 
2009, p. 8. 
Congressional Research Service 11 
The EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement and Its Implications for the United States 
To further facilitate bilateral trade in manufactured goods, the KOREU and KORUS FTAs 
include provisions on cross-cutting non-tariff barriers in major industrial sectors. These 
provisions include 
• Technical barriers to trade: to ensure standards and regulations are not applied 
in manner that unnecessarily inhibits trade in their development and applications; 
• Customs administration and trade facilitation: to ensure compliance with 
each other's customs laws and regulations; 
• Rules of origin: to define goods that originate in the FTA region and therefore 
are eligible for preferential treatment (these are in addition to the special rules of 
origin for autos as discussed earlier); 
• Competition laws and regulations: to promote cooperation in enforcing 
antitrust laws through the exchange of information and consultation; and, 
• Regulatory transparency: by publishing relevant regulations and administrative 
decisions as well as proposed regulations; to allow persons from the other party 
to make comments and to ask questions regarding proposed regulations; to notify 
such persons of administrative proceedings and to allow them to make 
presentations before final administrative action is taken; and to allow such 
persons to request review and appeal of administrative decisions. 
In addition, protocols are attached to the KOREU FTA agreement that affect manufactured goods 
trade. One protocol is on rules of origin, that is the criteria, such as allowable foreign (non-
KOREU FTA) content, for determining a product's eligibility for preferential treatment under the 
FTA. The protocol also contains the duty drawback provision discussed earlier. A second 
protocol calls for the two Parties to work together in facilitating customs issues. 
Agriculture 
Under the KOREU FTA, the EU's agricultural sector is expected to realize export gains as South 
Korea implements its commitments to open up its market. This trade agreement acknowledges 
South Korea's sensitivity on some agricultural products—reflected in provisions that require 
some opening—but indefinitely leave in place a few quotas and some high tariffs. Rice and rice 
products are excluded from coverage, as they also are in the KORUS FTA. Since the EU imports 
little in agricultural products from South Korea, those provisions are not discussed below. 
Market Access for Agricultural Products 
In 2009, EU agricultural exports to South Korea ($1.4 billion) accounted for almost 5% of total 
EU merchandise exports to that country. The leading five agricultural/food products shipped— 
pork, whiskies, corn, wine, and chocolate—accounted for 42% of the value of the EU's 
agricultural exports to the Korean market. In 2009, the EU-27 ranked fourth as the source of 
Korea's agricultural imports, while the United States placed first. 
The KOREU FTA would reduce South Korea's high tariffs and restrictive quotas on most 
agricultural imports from the EU over a 20 year period More than two thirds of these products (in 
value terms) that now enter the Korean market would benefit from free access by year five 
following its implementation as tariffs are eliminated and quotas increase. However, EU exporters 
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would receive immediate duty-free status for almost 30% ($430 million) of the agricultural 
exports they currently ship to South Korea. For comparison, under the KORUS FTA, U.S. 
exporters would immediately benefit from duty-free access for 62% (almost $2.7 billion) of their 
agricultural products shipped to Korea.27 
The KOREU FTA includes tariff reduction schedules and quota expansion provisions for 
agricultural products that are nearly similar to those found in the KORUS FTA However, both 
agreements differ slightly in how South Korea would be allowed to protect some of its more 
sensitive products. Because the EU is a smaller supplier of several such products compared to the 
United States, the size of many of the EU's preferential quotas in the Korean market may reflect 
this fact. For example, in year five, the EU's quota for natural honey would be 60 metric tons 
(MT), compared to the 225 MT quota granted to the United States. Further, South Korea's quotas 
for imports of three dairy products (non-fat dry milk, whole dry milk, and evaporated milk), 
natural honey, and seasonal oranges from the EU-27 would be indefinitely capped at the end of 
their respective transition periods. However, the size of the preferential quotas granted to the 
United States for these three same product categories would continue to increase 3% annually in 
perpetuity. Similarly, South Korea secured protection against import surges of nine agricultural 
products from the EU (compared to 30 products under the KORUS FTA). A "safeguard" would 
be automatically triggered when the quantity of a commodity entering the South Korean market 
exceeds a specified amount. When triggered, tariffs would temporarily revert to a higher level to 
give producers additional time to adjust to increased import competition. 
Though EU agricultural exports to South Korea are a small share of its total, observers note that 
the elimination of tariffs would particularly facilitate additional exports of pork products, wine, 
spirits, and processed foods. EU agricultural exporters would also benefit from the substantial 
savings associated with tariff reductions. Most acknowledge, though, that the KORUS FTA would 
have a more significant impact on agricultural exports to South Korea than is expected under the 
KOREU FTA.28 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Commitments 
The KOREU FTA's sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) chapter details the commitments and the 
process both countries would follow to address human, animal, and plant health issues that may 
arise in bilateral trade of agricultural products. It identifies those issue areas that would receive 
special attention (i.e., animal welfare standards, designation of pest- or disease-free areas and 
areas of low pest or disease prevalence). The KOREU FTA would establish a SPS committee to 
facilitate consultations on, and resolve, bilateral SPS problems as they arise, as would the 
KORUS FTA. While the KOREU FTA emphasizes this committee's responsibilities to implement 
commitments on the issue areas identified, the focus of the committee to be created under the 
KORUS FTA emphasizes the use of science and risk-based assessment to resolve SPS matters 
through bilateral technical cooperation and consultation. Both agreements prescribe that dispute 
settlement provisions cannot be used as recourse to address any SPS issue that might arise in 
bilateral trade. 
These figures are derived by CRS by applying Korea's tariff reduction schedule commitments made in each trade 
agreement against EU and U.S. agricultural exports in calendar year 2009. 
28
 European Parliament, "An Assessment of the EU-Korea FTA," July 2010, pp. 15,23. 
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Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products 
The KOREU FTA has more expansive provisions on geographic indications (GIs) than does the 
KORUS FTA. GIs (similar to a trademark) refer to marks that "identify a good as originating in 
the territory of a country, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation 
or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin."29 The use 
of GIs applies primarily to wines, spirits, and agricultural products. For example, "Rocquefort" 
cheese from France is an EU-designated GI. 
Because GIs are commercially valuable in international trade, the EU in negotiating its bilateral 
trade agreements has sought to secure additional protection for its Gl-designated agricultural and 
beverage products in FTA partner country markets beyond what multilateral trading rules 
currently provide. This means that Gl-designated products are eligible for relief from acts of 
infringement and/or unfair competition under a country's trademark laws and regulations. 
Reflecting this objective, the EU in its FTA with South Korea secured protection for 165 Gl-
designated products (e.g., wines, spirits, cheeses, hams, and beers). South Korea secured Gl 
recognition in the EU market for 64 of its Gl-designated products (teas, spices, vegetables, rices, 
fruits, meats, among others). The U.S. dairy sector has expressed concern that the Gl-designation 
of various EU cheeses in the South Korean market could undercut the sale of U.S. generically-
labeled cheeses in that market with identical names. Accordingly, Members of Congress have 
urged the USTR to work with their counterparts to ensure that South Korean regulations drafted 
to implement the KOREU FTA do not impair the dairy market access concessions that the United 
States would receive under the KORUS FTA. 
Services Trade 
The EU made increased market access to the South Korean market for services a high priority, 
given the relative competitiveness of EU-based services providers and the openness of EU 
markets going into the negotiations compared to South Korean providers and markets. As WTO 
members, the EU-27 and South Korea adhere to and have made commitments under the WTO's 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).30 However, competitive services providers, 
especially from the EU and the United States, view the GATS, that resulted from the Uruguay 
Round negotiations, as just a first step in establishing a multilateral framework on trade in 
services. As a result, its trade liberalizing commitments are far below what many WTO members 
consider necessary to effectively reduce barriers to trade in services. The KOREU FTA would 
expand on the commitments that the EU members and South Korea have made under the GATS. 
KOREU FTA addresses the overall rules for EU-South Korea trade in services, such as allowing 
for the establishment of a commercial presence by a service provider from one Party to the 
agreement through investment in the other Party. The agreement establishes the basic principles 
by which the two Parties would conduct bilateral trade in services covered by the agreement. 
These principles include non-discriminatory treatment—both most-ravored-nation treatment and 
national treatment and market access which proscribes government restrictions on trade in 
covered services but allows for exceptions for government restrictions for prudential objectives. 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Article 22.1. 
30
 The GATS is the WTO multilateral trade agreement that establishes rule of the road for trade in services as the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade does for trade in goods. Under the GATS rules, each WTO member has made 
sector-specific commitments to liberalize trade in services. 
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Among other things, the chapter also calls for transparency in establishing regulations on 
services. 
The KOREU FTAuses the "positive list approach" rather than the "negative list approach," in 
laying out the schedule of these commitments. The positive list requires each Party to specifically 
identify the types of services for which it will provide national treatment and market access to 
providers from the other Party.31 By contrast, the KORUS FTAuses the negative list. 
Notwithstanding the "positive list," the EU-Korea FTA covers a broad range of services, 
including transportation services, telecommunications, finance, legal services, environmental 
services and construction, and largely mirrors coverage found in the KORUS FTA. South Korea 
obtained increased access to EU markets for architecture, engineering, urban planning, 
landscaping, printing and publishing, telecommunication, construction, finance, and 
transportation services. However, as requested by the EU, the KOREU FTA would not open 
markets for medical, education, and audiovisual services.33 
Because South Korea's services market is much more restricted that the EU's, the EU had 
particular interest in obtaining increased market access in South Korea for its legal, financial, 
retail, transportation, and telecommunications services. In general, South Korea agreed to provide 
similar access for its markets for EU providers as would be given to U.S. providers under the 
proposed KORUS FTA. According to the European Commission, the KOREU FTA would 
provide the most comprehensive treatment of services trade of any EU FTA.34. 
For example, in the area of legal services, an EU priority during the negotiations was to secure 
South Korea's commitment to allow EU firms to increase their onsite presence. In that regard, by 
date the agreement enters into force, EU-based law firms would be permitted to open 
representative offices in South Korea to advise foreign investors and local clients on non-Korean 
law. No later than two years after that effective date, EU law firms' representative offices would 
be able to enter into cooperative agreements with Korean law firms, and no later than five years 
after that date, they would be permitted to form joint ventures with Korean firms. The KORUS 
FTA contains similar provisions for U.S. law firms. 
In the area of telecommunication services, under the KOREU FTA, South Korea would allow EU 
telecommunications providers to own 100% of the voting shares of Korean-based providers, 
except for the KT Corporation and SL Telecom Co, for which the share of ownership would be 
limited to 49% or less. Under the KORUS FTA, U.S. telecommunications firms would have 
similar access to ownership. In addition, under the KOREU FTA, South Korea would allow EU 
satellite telephone and television providers to operate directly into South Korea without the need 
to have a business tie with a domestic company. The EU views this as an important benefit to EU 
31
 The "negative list" approach requires each Party to list only those types of services for which it is not prepared to 
provide national treatment and market access. In addition, under the negative list approach new types of services that 
are developed after the trade agreement enters into force, are considered part of the trade liberalizing schedule of 
commitments unless otherwise identified. On balance, the negative list is considered to be the more trade liberalizing 
approach. It is also the approach that the United States has employed in its FTAs, including the proposed KORUS FTA. 
WTO members employ the positive list in the GATS. 
32
 Lee, Jong-Kyu. KOREA-EUFTA: Major Features and Implications. Samsung Economic Research Institute, August 
2009, p. 10. 
"Ibid. 
34
 European Commission, DG Trade, EU-Korea FTA: A Quick Reading Guide, October 20,2009, p.7. 
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providers.35 The KORUS FTAdoes not appear to mention such operations; so it is not clear if 
U.S. satellite broadcasters would have similar access. 
In general, the EU and South Korea agreed to provide access to their respective financial markets 
as the United States and South Korea agreed to under the KORUS FTA. Because of the positive 
list approach, EU commitments in services are member-specific, so not all of the 27 members 
may have committed to any specific trade liberalization measure. In insurance, 21 of the EU 27 
countries and South Korea agreed to open up their respective markets for direct insurance in 
maritime shipping, commercial aviation, and space launching and in insurance for the 
international transport of goods. South Korea and some EU members would also open their 
markets for risk management services. In banking and other financial services, South Korea and 
20 of the 27 EU members would allow financial institutions from each others' territories to 
provide and transfer financial information and data across their borders and to provide advisory 
and other auxiliary services. While the KOREU FTA appears to be cautious regarding financial 
services liberalization in some respects, it appears to be forward looking in other respects. For 
example, its provisions would apply to all financial services including new financial services. 
The KORUS FTA handles financial services somewhat differently. It distinguishes two broad 
categories of delivery of services. One category is services sold by a service provider located in 
one FTA partner country to residents in the other partner country through an affiliate located in 
the territory of the latter partner country (commercial presence). The second category is services 
sold by a provider located in one partner country to a national of the other partner country no 
matter the location of that national (cross-border trade). 
In the case of providers with a commercial presence, the KORUS FTA would apply to all 
financial services. As with the KOREU FTA, it would also automatically cover any new financial 
service. In the case of cross-border trade, the KORUS FTA coverage would be limited to those 
banking and insurance services listed in the agreement.36 It is not clear whether the difference in 
approaches between these two FTAs would yield different levels of trade liberalization. 
Other Provisions 
Trade Remedies 
The trade remedy provisions in the KOREU FTA (anti-dumping, countervailing duty, and 
safeguard measures) closely resemble those in the KORUS FTA. Among other things, they 
include 
• special bilateral safeguard provisions allowing either Party to either suspend 
phase-out of tariff rates or increase customs duties on an import of a product 
European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies, Policy Department, An Assessment of the EU-Korea 
FTA, July 2010, p. 75. 
36
 Regarding insurance, the FTA's coverage would be limited to cross-border trade in marine, aviation, and transit 
insurance; reinsurance; services auxiliary to insurance, such as consultancy, risk assessment, and actuarial and claim 
settlement services; and insurance intermediation services such as brokerage and agency services. Regarding banking 
and securities, the agreement's coverage in cross-border trade would be limited to providing financial information and 
data processing, advisory, and other auxiliary financial services. 
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from the other Party, if surges in imports of that product cause or threaten to 
cause serious injury to the domestic industry; 
• special safeguard measures to counter the adverse effects of imports surges of 
specified agricultural products; 
• special notification to one Party of a global safeguard measure imposed by the 
other Party, if the former would be one of the top five suppliers of the product in 
question; and 
• a commitment by both sides to abide by WTO agreements on antidumping and 
countervailing duty measures when imposing those measures. 
Government Procurement 
The Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) is a WTO plurilateral pact that applies to only 
those WTO members that are signatories. Under the GPA, government contracts for goods and 
services to be used for public purposes are opened up to bids from providers from other signatory 
countries. The GPA applies to contracts valued above a specified threshold and to contracts let by 
those agencies that each signatory country lists in its schedule of commitments. The EU, South 
Korea, and the United States are GPA signatories. Under the KOREU FTA, both sides reaffirm 
their commitments to open up government procurement contracts to bidding by foreign providers 
under the GPA. Under the KOREU FTA (and the KORUS FTA) South Korea would apply the 
trade liberalization provisions to a larger number of public agencies than required under the GPA. 
Under the KORUS FTA, the United States and South Korea would lower the thresholds beyond 
those established under the GPA for eligibility of contracts for supplies and services and for 
contracts for construction services, thus potentially opening up more government procurement 
opportunities to bilateral trade. The EU-Korea FTA would adhere to the GPA thresholds. The 
KOREU FTA includes a special section that would open up build-on-transfer (BOT) and public 
works contracts valued above 15 million SDRs (or about $22.5 million).37 The EU considers this 
provision to be an important contribution of the agreement because these contracts are not 
covered by the WTO GPA.38 The KORUS FTA has no such special provision, although these 
contracts appear to be included in the coverage of the agreement. 
Intellectual Property Rights 
The KOREU FTA would reaffirm each of the EU and South Korean commitments to uphold the 
provisions of the WTO Trade-Related Intellectual Property (TRIPS) agreement as well as other 
international conventions on the protection of owners of intellectual property (IP)—copyrights, 
trademarks, and patents. While at one time an issue, South Korea protection of IP has improved to 
the point it is not an issue, at least in U.S.-South Korean trade relations. The agreement also 
contains provisions to assist owners to obtain payment for the use of their IP and expands on 
In the agreement, a BOT contract is defined as "any contractual arrangement the primary purpose of which is to 
provide for the construction or rehabilitation of physical infrastructure, plant, buildings, facilities, or other government-
owned works and under which, as consideration for a supplier's execution of a contractual arrangement, a procuring 
entity grants to the supplier, for a specified period of time, temporary ownership or a right to control and operate, and 
demand payment for the use of, such works for the duration of the contract." 
38
 Europa. EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement: 10 Key Benefits for the European Union. Memo/10/423, 
http://www.europa.eu. 
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protection of the rights of designers. The agreement would extend authors' rights to 70 years after 
the death of the author, the same as under the KORUS FTA. The KOREU FTA commits both 
sides to preserve the integrity of certain geographical indicators (GIs), an issue important to EU 
producers of food products for which they want to emphasize the origin of the region in which 
those products are produced. 
Trade and Sustainable Development—Labor and Environmental Standards 
The KOREU FTA combines provisions on workers' rights and on environmental standards into 
one chapter devoted to trade and sustainable development, unlike the KORUS FTA which handles 
them separately. Similar to provisions in the KORUS FTA, the KOREU FTA would commit both 
sides to uphold International Labor Organization (1LO) core labor standards as well as ratify all 
1LO conventions that go beyond the core labor standards.39 
Under the KOREU FTA, both sides also agree to uphold and effectively implement all 
multilateral environment agreements to which they are a party. The EU and South Korea also 
agree to uphold the multilateral environmental agreements to which they are a party. In addition, 
the EU and South Korea would commit to not lowering enforcement of labor standards or 
environmental standards in a way that would affect trade or investment between them. The two 
sides would also set up advisory groups to monitor the implementation of workers rights and 
environmental provisions and to set up a panel of independent experts to resolve issues that arise 
during implementation In this respect, the treatment of labor rights and environmental issues 
under the KOREU FTA is similar to that under the KORUS FTA. However, the proposed KORUS 
FTA provides for disputes under the labor and environmental chapter to be resolved through the 
agreement's dispute settlement mechanism, and thus the possibility of sanctions, if consultations 
do not resolve the dispute. In contrast, the KOREU FTA states that disputes can only be resolved 
through consultations and does not provide for any sanctions. 
Potential Economic Impact of the KOREU FTA 
Most of the studies done on the impact of the KOREU FTA estimate that the agreement will have 
a small but positive affect on the economies of the EU and South Korea as a whole and that the 
larger relative impact would be on the South Korean economy. This conclusion logically follows 
from the fact that the South Korean economy is much smaller than the EU, more dependent on 
the EU market than is the opposite case, and has higher trade barriers than the EU; therefore, the 
effects of trade liberalization under the KOREU FTA would be greater in relative terms for South 
Korea. However, in both cases, the impact of the agreement on the overall economy on both sides 
would be small, reflecting the larger role played by other countries in their trade and also the 
larger impact that other economic activities—domestic consumption, government spending, and 
business investment—have in their economies. 
To many outside observers, South Korea's labor rights regime is generally considered to be strong for regular 
workers. South Korea ranks in the top third of the OECD's thirty members in terms of employment protection for 
regular workers. Indeed, for years, a major complaint by multinational corporations is that restrictions in the South 
Korean labor market, such as mandatory severance pay, significantly raise the cost of investing and doing business in 
Korea. 
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Most studies indicate that South Korea's GDP would increase l%-2% after the KOREU FTA is 
implemented, while the EU GDP would increase less than fJ.05%.40 Studies regarding the impact 
of the KORUS FTA on the United States and South Korea yielded comparable magnitudes, an 
expected result given the similarities in the size and comparable levels of development of the EU 
and the United States and the similarities in the KOREU FTA and the KORUS FTA.41 
As with most other FTAs, the greatest economic impact of the KOREU FTA would be on specific 
sectors in each economy. Those having a comparative advantage vis-a-vis those in their other 
country are most likely to experience the greatest benefits while import-sensitive sectors would 
experience the least gains, if not losses, when the agreement is implemented. EU services 
providers would be expected to experience gains from the agreement, especially in the areas of 
retail and wholesale trade; transportation services; financial services; and business services.42 This 
conclusion follows from the feet that EU service providers are among the world's most 
competitive and EU markets the most open, while the South Korean services market is relatively 
closed. In terms of trade in goods, EU exporters of pharmaceuticals, auto parts, industrial 
machinery, electronics parts, and some agricultural goods and processed foods would be expected 
to gain from the KOREU FTA's implementation. At the same time, South Korean producers of 
cars, ships, wireless telecommunications devices, chemical products, and imaging equipment 
would be expected to increase their exports to the EU market.43 
Next Steps—Ratification 
The EU is now in the midst of the approval process for the KOREU FTA. Trade agreements must 
first be approved by the Council of the European Union (the Council), a body consisting of 
ministers from each of the 27 member states with the power to approve or reject all EU 
legislation. While technically a qualified majority of the ministers is required to approve a trade 
agreement, in practice the Council has required a consensus, meaning that any single member-
state can veto a trade agreement. After the Council gives its consent, the agreement is sent to the 
European Parliament (EP) whose members are directly elected by citizens of the member states. 
A trade agreement needs to be approved by a simple majority of the 736 European 
parliamentarians. 
Both the Council and the EP vote on the trade agreement as initialed and presented by the 
European Commission, the executive body of the EU which negotiates the agreement on behalf 
of the member states. The agreement cannot be amended. If and when the Council and the EP 
have approved a trade agreement, the Council decides on a date for "provisional application." 
Then, most elements of the trade agreement would enter into force, but elements in which only 
European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies, Policy Department, An Assessment of the EU-Korea 
FTA, July 2010, p. 23. 
41
 A study by the U.S. International Trade Commission estimates mat U.S. GDP would increase approximately 0.1% 
and a study by the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy estimates that South Korean GDP would increase 
0.42% to 0.59% if and when the KORUS FTA is fully implemented These estimates are discussed in CRS Report 
RL34330, The Proposed U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA): Provisions and Implications, 
coordinated by William H. Cooper. 
42
 European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies, Policy Department, An Assessment of the EU-Korea 
FTA, July 2010, pp. 23-24. 
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the individual member states have sole or mixed competence would enter into force after 
subsequent national ratifications have been completed. 
On September 16, 2010, the Council approved the KOREU FTA after debate within the Council. 
Italy initially opposed the agreement and raised concerns that increased competition from South 
Korean car manufacturers would adversely affect the Italian auto industry. Among other things, 
Italy objected to duty drawback provision of the agreement.45 Italy lifted its objection reportedly 
after the other trade ministers agreed to postpone the agreement's provisional application until 
July 1, 2011. EU and South Korean leaders signed the agreement at the EU-South Korea Summit 
held on October 6,201c.46 
In the meantime, both the Council and the EP are considering a special safeguard mechanism in 
the KOREU FTA. The safeguard would allow EU industries to petition for relief in the form of 
increased tariffs or suspension of tariff reductions, if, as a result of this trade agreement, imports 
from South Korea surge at a rate that causes serious injury to the EU industry. Unlike a trade 
agreement, legislation enacting the safeguard can be amended and the final version is the product 
of negotiation between the Council and the European Parliament. Like the FTA, this measure 
must be approved by both bodies for this safeguard to go into effect. One controversial issue is 
that the current version of the safeguard proposal would permit safeguard investigations measures 
to be initiated regionally, if the effects of the import surges are concentrated only in certain 
regions. It is uncertain when an EP vote on the KOREU FTA will take place. 
In South Korea, the KOREU FTA must be approved by a majority vote in the unicameral 
National Assembly to take effect. President Lee's government submitted a ratification bill to the 
Assembly on October 25, 2010. Unlike in the United States, trade agreements in Korea are not 
subject to any fast-track time lines. The Assembly is controlled by President Lee Myung-bak's 
Grand National Party; thus, the agreement generally is expected to be approved. 
Potential Implications of the KOREU FTA for the 
United States 
The potential implications for the United States if the KOREU FTA enters into force are 
complicated, making an accurate assessment difficult. Nevertheless, some observations can be 
made. For example, most assessments of the potential economic effects of the agreement 
conclude that South Korea's GDP, and to a lesser degree the EU's GDP, would increase with the 
removal of trade barriers and the improved use of resources. The additional economic growth 
could translate into increased demand for imports, including those from the United States, 
whether or not the KORUS FTA has yet entered into force. 
However, attention has begun to turn to the potential impact of the KOREU FTA on specific U.S. 
industries and sectors, and in particular on what happens to their sales to, and engagement in, the 
Such measures in the KOREU FTA would be criminal penalties for non-compliance with 1PR laws, transport 
provision, and a co-production issue regarding the Protocol on Cultural Cooperation. European Parliament, Directorate-
General for External Policies, Policy Department, An Assessment of the EU-Korea FTA, July 2010, pp. 33-34. 
45
 Daily Report for Executives. September 9, 2010. 
46
 Wall Street Journal.vrsj.com accessed on September 16, 2010. 
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South Korean market if the KOREU FTA enters into force before the KORUS FTAdoes, 
assuming that the KORUS FTAdoes at all. If this scenario unfolds, EU manufacturers of products 
and some agricultural producers that compete head-to-head with their U.S. competitors could 
benefit from the price advantage achieved as South Korean tariffs and non-tariff barriers on their 
products are phased out or eliminated, while Korean tariffs on U.S. products begin to be reduced 
later or stay the same. Goods that might be affected this way include pharmaceuticals and medical 
devices, scientific equipment, industrial machinery, and some agricultural products. However, this 
advantage would likely not be present if the KORUS FTA enters into force about the same time 
as, or very soon after, the KOREU FTA does. 
Some members of the U.S. business community argue that it is important for the KORUS FTA to 
take effect before the KOREU FTA does in order to secure "first-mover" benefits (i.e., the 
elimination of and/or lower South Korean tariffs for U.S. products). If not, EU exporters would 
be positioned to benefit first, an advantage that could continue even if the KORUS FTA is later 
approved, as EU firms have already entrenched stronger positions in the South Korean market. 
What might mitigate such an advantage, though, if the EU moves first, would be those U.S. 
exporters who are already well established in the South Korean market based on other factors 
besides price, and a U.S. dollar that is lower in value to the euro compared to recent history— 
offsetting the tariff advantage benefiting EU exporters. 
To illustrate, on the manufacturing side, EU carmakers might be able to reduce the price of their 
higher-priced luxury vehicle such as the BMW 528 or Mercedes 3000, giving them another 
advantage, while U.S. automakers of luxury vehicles will continue to pay the 8% auto tariff. U.S. 
manufacturers have a small share of imported passenger vehicles sales (10%) in South Korea, 
compared to sales of imported cars from the EU (62%). Passage of the KOREU FTA could 
further enhance the strong position of European automakers in the South Korean market. 
The case of frozen french fry potatoes is a second example. South Korea's MFN tariff on frozen 
potato products (french fries) is 18%. Under both the KOREU and KORUS FTAs, Korea would 
immediately reduce this tariff to zero. In calendar 2009, the United States accounted for 81% ($36 
million) of Korea's frozen potato imports; the EU's share was 2% (about $900,000). If the 
KOREU were to take effect before the KORUS FTA, the elimination of the 18% tariff, combined 
with lower transportation costs from Europe than from U.S. Pacific ports, could give EU 
exporters a competitive price advantage over U.S. firms and enable them to quickly increase their 
market share. Further, the EU with the largest frozen potato processing capacity in the world 
could be able to easily meet the additional demand created by this market opening. 
Services is another area in which U.S. and EU providers compete for access to the South Korean 
market, especially in such areas as business services, professional services, financial services, and 
express delivery. Presumably, EU providers might obtain an advantage over their U.S. 
competitors if the KOREU FTA enters into force, but that advantage would likely be diminished 
if the KORUS FTA takes effect. The cross-border services and the financial services chapters in 
the KORUS FTA contain MFN provisions which state in essence that any preferences that South 
Korea gives to a non-Party (such as the EU) in another FTA, it must also give to the United 
States. The services chapter in the KOREU FTA also contains an MFN provision but is more 
restricted and would not necessarily require South Korea to accord to EU the preferences it would 
give to the United States under the KORUS FTA 
In sum, the KOREU FTA, if and when it is implemented will likely strengthen the fledgling EU-
South Korean economic relationship and give the EU a significant economic presence in East 
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Asia. EU firms are important competitors with U.S. firms in a number of areas, including 
services; therefore, the KOREU FTA will likely have important implications for the United States 
and could play a role in the shape and timing of the expected congressional debate on the 
KORUS FTA in the 112th Congress. 
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Appendix. Selected Economic Indicators, Tariff, 
and Trade Tables 
Table A-1 . Selected Economic andTariff Indicators for European Union, 
United States, and South Korea, 2009 
European Union United States South Korea 
Population in millions (July 2010 estimate) 492 310 49 
GDP - Purchasing Power Parity in trillions of U.S. $ (2009) 
GDP - Real Growth Rate in percent (2009 est.) 
GDP - Per Capita (PPP) in U.S. $(2009 est.) 
MFN Average Applied Tariffs, 2009* (percent) 
All Goods 
Agricultural Goods 
Non-Agricultural Goods 
Source: CIA, The Worid foabook, as updated November 9, 2010; WTO, Country Profiles, October 2010. 
a. Simple average of import duties 
$14.43 
-4.1% 
$32,500 
5.3% 
13.5% 
4.0% 
$14.14 
-2.6% 
$46,000 
3.5% 
4.7% 
3.3% 
$1.36 
0.2% 
$28,100 
12.1% 
48.6% 
6.6% 
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Table A-2. EU and U.S.Trade with South Korea, 2009 
T O T A L MERCHANDISE TRADE 
Exports to South Korea 
Imports from South Korea 
Trade Balance 
TRADE BY SELECTED SECTORS 
Automobiles 
Exports to South Korea 
Imports from South Korea 
Agriculture 
Exports to South Korea 
Imports from South Korea 
Machinery; Reactors, Boilers 
Exports to South Korea 
Imports from South Korea 
Pharmaceuticals 
Exports to South Korea 
Imports from South Korea 
Medical Devices 
Exports to South Korea 
Imports from South Korea 
Textiles & Apparel 
Exports to South Korea 
Imports from South Korea 
European 
Union 
United 
States 
biWon US $ 
$29.9 
$44.9 
-$15.0 
$28.6 
$39.2 
-$10.6 
million US $ 
2,037 
7,185 
1,405 
85 
6,740 
5,193 
1.321 
38 
839 
634 
611 
800 
388 
4,665 
3,961 
324 
4,417 
8,546 
501 
96 
859 
328 
210 
934 
Sources: Gbbal Trade Atlas; World Trade Organization. 
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Table A-3. EU FTAs Since 2006 
Status 
ASEAN» 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Canada 
CARIFORUM States'" 
Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama) 
Colombia and Peru 
GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council)0 
India 
Malaysia 
MERCOSURd 
Montenegro 
South Korea 
Serbia 
Singapore 
Ukraine 
Vietnam 
South Africa 
Negotiations begun in June 2007 but suspended. 
Agreement in force 
Negotiations ongoing 
Agreement pending ratification 
Negotiations concluded 
Negotiations ongoing 
Negotiations suspended 
Negotiations ongoing 
Negotiations ongoing 
Negotiations ongoing 
Agreement in force 
Agreement signed 
Agreement in force 
Negotiations ongoing 
Negotiations ongoing 
Negotiations ongoing 
Negotiations ongoing 
Note: The EU has established a network of various preferential trade arrangements besides FTAs. For more 
information see CRS Report R41143, Europe's Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications, by 
Raymond J. Ahearn. 
a. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations' ten members are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, The Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
b. The CARIFORUM states are: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, the Dominican 
Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Christopher 
and Nevis, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago. 
c. The Gulf Cooperation Council consists of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, 
and Oman. 
d. Mercosur is the Common Market of the South established by Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay. 
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Table A-4. South Korea's FTAs 
FT As in effect 
Korea-Chile FTA 
Korea-Singapore FTA 
Korea-EFTA FTA" 
Concluded FTAs 
Korea-US. FTA 
Korea-EU FTA 
FTAs under negotiation 
Korea-Canada FTA 
Korea-Mexico FTA 
Korea-GCO FTA 
Korea-Australia FTA 
FTAs under consideration 
Korea-Japan FTA 
Korea-China FTA 
Korea-China-Japan FTA 
Korea-MERCOSUR FTA« 
Korea-ASEANFTA* 
Korea-India Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
Agreement (CEPA) 
Korea-Peru FTA 
Korea-New Zealand FTA 
Korea-Colombia FTA 
Korea-Turkey FTA 
Korea-Russia Bilateral Economic Partnership Agreement 
(BEPA) 
Korea-Israel FTA 
Korea-SACU FTA" 
Source: South Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 
a. The Assocation of Southeast Asian Nations' ten members are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, The Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
b. EFTA is comprised of Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein. 
c. The Gulf Cooperation Council consists of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, 
and Oman. 
d. The five members of the Southern African Customs Union are Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, 
and Swaziland. 
e. Mercosur is the Common Market of the South established by Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay. 
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